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Abstract
For most non-financial events, risk-neutral outcome probabilities are
identical across numeraire currencies. Some events, however, such as
elections or referendums, may have an impact on exchange rates. This
implies numeraire dependence in risk-neutral outcome probabilities,
which leads to different state prices for affected currency pairs. If
betting odds available to punters do not reflect these differences, this
may give rise to (approximate) arbitrage opportunities. Despite the
sizable risk this creates, odds quoted by bookmakers seem to ignore
this effect.
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1 Introduction
Risk-neutral probabilities of event outcomes can be inferred from betting
odds, which are just the state prices for these outcomes expressed according
to betting market conventions. Nowadays, betting services are offered online
and across borders. During the registration process on the corresponding
websites, punters have the choice of a preferred currency from a pool of cur-
rencies offered. The chosen currency is then used for all transactions on this
website.1 Aside from the traditional bookmakers’ business model taken on-
line, a newer type of betting marketplace known as betting exchanges allows
punters also to sell (in betting jargon: to “lay”) the outcome. An inspection
of major betting websites shows that whereas betting odds typically differ
slightly among bookmakers and betting exchanges, the odds quoted on any
particular website are identical across all available transaction currencies. As
pointed out by Neuberger (2016), this may give rise to potentially very prof-
itable strategies involving bets on different outcomes in different currencies
if exchange rates react to the outcomes differently and predictably.
There is a sizable literature analyzing the efficiency of various betting
markets, which also identifies a number of potential behavioral biases in bet-
ting odds (see, e.g., Williams and Siegel, 2013). One such behavioral reason
for observing different odds in different countries/currencies is home bias,
which may tilt perceived outcome probabilities depending on the country of
residence and, hence, currencies. This bias may lead bookmakers to quote,
e.g., different odds in Italy and Brazil for bets on the result of a soccer game
between their national teams (see, e.g., Golec and Tamarkin, 1991). From a
neoclassical perspective, different risk-free interest rates may lead to differ-
ences in betting odds across transaction currencies (even if exchange rates
are independent of event outcomes). However, these differences are typically
small and easily hidden/absorbed in the bookmaker’s “cut”, which is betting
1For an overview of transaction currencies offered by large online bookmakers, see
https://tinyurl.com/y9clv6nh.
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jargon for the bid-ask spread implied in betting odds. In this paper, we an-
alyze a neoclassical reason for currency dependence of betting odds, which
seems to have received almost no attention so far from neither academia nor
practice, and which lies at the heart of the strategies suggested by Neuberger
(2016). It occurs for certain political events such as elections or referendums,
which are expected to affect exchange rates. As two recent examples for such
events, consider the U.K. Brexit referendum and the U.S. presidential elec-
tions. In June 2016, the British pound fell sharply after a majority in the
U.K. voted in favor of leaving the European Union. This downward jump in
the exchange rate reflected market expectations of negative economic effects
resulting from this referendum outcome. In November 2016, the Mexican
peso weakened markedly after Donald Trump was elected U.S. president.
This resulted from remarks Trump had made during his election campaign
regarding plans to impose high tariffs on many goods imported from Mexico
to protect U.S. industry, and to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexican border.
Neuberger (2016) proposes a strategy combining bets in pounds and eu-
ros, which is similar to the strategies used in this paper to derive no-arbitrage
conditions. He points out that the strategy is risky, because exchange rates
might react differently than expected, and he is worried that “much, if not
all, of your profit will be eaten up by the bookie’s spread and any commis-
sion charges you have to pay”. We will show that this was not the case for
bets on the Brexit referendum, and that the only requirement to make a
profit was to correctly forecast a weakening of the pound in case of a ma-
jority voting for Leave, regardless of its magnitude. Finally, Neuberger asks
himself why bookmakers do not change the odds according to the currency
of the bet. His explanation is that while internationally active bookmakers
are used to having significant currency exposures across their books, most
bets are unrelated to exchange rate movements. Given that political betting
makes up only a relatively small share of their business, Neuberger concludes
that “the amount they are likely to lose from people exploiting the current
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system is probably small”. Relative to the ideas presented by Neuberger
(2016) for a general audience and in everyday language, the contribution of
the present paper can be seen in providing a formal financial economics basis
for the strategies he suggests and a detailed analysis of the underlying effect
itself, the impact of transaction costs, and the risk-adjusted return of the
cross-currency betting strategies. Under the simplifying assumption of per-
fect ex ante information on conditional (i.e., outcome-dependent) exchange
rate reactions after the respective events, we derive no-arbitrage conditions.
Relaxing this assumption and acknowledging the risk associated with condi-
tional exchange rate movements turns the arbitrage opportunities into good
deals (Cochrane and Saa-Requejo, 2002) or approximate arbitrage opportu-
nities (i.e., strategies with a very favorable Sharpe ratio, see Shanken, 1992).
Arbitrage opportunities in betting markets have been documented in the lit-
erature, see e.g. Dixon and Pope (2004) and Vlastakis, Dotsis, and Markellos
(2009) for arbitrage opportunities in bookmaker betting, or Franck, Verbeek,
and Nu¨esch (2013) for inter-market arbitrage using bets placed with book-
makers and betting exchanges. In contrast, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)
compare prices on two major betting exchanges and find that arbitrage op-
portunities are virtually absent. Our results in this paper show that even
though the no-arbitrage conditions traditionally checked in this literature
are satisfied, this does not protect bookmakers from being exploited via ap-
proximate arbitrage strategies with very favorable Sharpe ratios and low loss
probabilities. This is followed by a numerical illustration using real-world
data from the Brexit referendum and the U.S. presidential elections 2016.
Hanke, Poulsen, and Weissensteiner (2019) show how information from
betting odds can be combined with risk-neutral densities estimated from FX
option prices to arrive at conditional exchange rate forecasts around such
events. They note (see their footnote 9) that they “have no indication of
systematic differences across geographical regions although theoretically, the
risk-neutral event probabilities might differ slightly depending on the nu-
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meraire currency.” In the present paper, we analyze why and by how much
risk-neutral outcome probabilities (and betting odds) for such events should
differ across currencies. In contrast to other effects documented in the litera-
ture, the reason for this difference is not behavioral, but purely neoclassical.
So far, the effect we describe in this paper does not seem to be reflected
in bookmakers’ quoted odds, as we could not find any hint to currency-
dependent quotes on any of the major betting websites. Given the size of
these political betting markets, the resulting risk for bookmakers is not to
be underestimated: The largest internet betting exchange, Betfair, alone
reported a total betting volume of 127 million pounds for the Brexit referen-
dum2 and around 200 million pounds for the U.S. presidential elections.3
The relevance of our results extends beyond betting markets. The effects
analyzed in this paper occur whenever event risk is correlated with exchange
rates, and when this event risk is tradable via financial contracts in differ-
ent currencies. One example for such a situation are Credit Default Swaps
(CDS), where the probability of the credit event may depend on exchange
rate movements. Lando and Nielsen (2018) analyze this effect and show that
CDS spreads on a particular reference entity should be currency-dependent
if exchange rate fluctuations and the default intensity of the reference entity
are correlated. There are a number of differences between their model and
our setting, however: Whereas the political events analyzed in this paper af-
fect exchange rates, exchange rate movements affect the occurrence of credit
events. Moreover, the event dates in Lando and Nielsen (2018) are uncer-
tain, and interest rate uncertainty is an additional important driver for CDS
spreads, which leads them to a different modeling approach.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present our model and
describe the effect that is the focus of this paper. Section 3 analyzes the con-
sequences of the observed mispricing in betting markets. Section 4 provides
2https://tinyurl.com/lgjzo3a
3https://tinyurl.com/m4mrkpn
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a numerical illustration of these consequences, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
For simplicity of exposition, we explain our model based on the Brexit
referendum. The derivation in the case of the U.S. presidential elections (not
shown) works along the same lines. Both cases will be illustrated numerically
in Section 4. We use the terminology of financial economics, relating it to
betting jargon where appropriate. Our notation is based on that used in
Hanke et al. (2019), making it more precise where needed in the present
context.
2.1 Risk-neutral Event Outcome Probabilities Implied
in Betting Odds
Let time τ be the time when information about the referendum result
becomes known to the market. There are two possible states, Leave (L) and
Remain (R). Betting payoffs at time τ can be related to state prices ψL (ψR)
at time t < τ , i.e., the prices of the Arrow securities paying off 1 in case of
state Leave (Remain) and 0 otherwise (see, e.g., Duffie (2001, Chapter 1), or
LeRoy and Werner (2014, Sections 5.2 and 5.7)). Throughout this paper, we
assume constant and flat interest rates and the existence of a unique risk-
neutral pricing measure in each currency. For bets placed in U.S. dollars, the
state prices in dollars can be computed as the payoffs’ discounted expected
values under the standard risk-neutral measure Q$, which uses the dollar
money market account as the numeraire:
ψ$L = e
−r(τ−t)E$t [1L] (1)
= e−r(τ−t)q$L,
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where r is the (constant) U.S. risk-free interest rate, 1L denotes the indicator
function taking on a value of 1 (corresponding to a payoff of one U.S. dollar)
if the referendum outcome is Leave and 0 otherwise, and we suppress the
time subscripts for state prices and risk-neutral probabilities for notational
simplicity. q$L is usually referred to as the “risk-neutral Leave probability”
under the measure Q$ (see, e.g., Duffie (2001, Chapter 1), or LeRoy and
Werner (2014, Sections 5.2 and 5.7)), and q$R is defined analogously. The
term “risk-neutral valuation” is used also in the case of incomplete markets,
where the particular “risk-neutral” probability measure chosen by the market
contains a risk premium (see, e.g., Bjo¨rk, 2009, Section 15.2). Equation (1)
directly links state prices and risk-neutral event outcome probabilities. This
relation must hold for any currency. For bets placed in pounds, the relation
between state price and risk-neutral Leave probability reads as
ψ£L = e
−i(τ−t)E£t [1L] (2)
= e−i(τ−t)q£L ,
where i is the U.K. risk-free interest rate.
Odds quoted by bookmakers or on betting exchanges follow different mar-
ket conventions, with fractional odds and decimal odds being the most com-
mon. Their conversion into state prices is straightforward. Fractional odds
of 4/1 mean that for every unit you bet, winning results in a gain of 4 units,
plus you get your stake back for a total payoff of 5. The equivalent decimal
odds would be 5.0, describing the total winning payoff for a stake of 1. Both
odds correspond to a state price of 0.2. For positive risk-free interest rates,
equations (1) and (2) imply risk-neutral probabilities slightly above 0.2, de-
pending on the remaining time to the event. In practice, given that bets
usually have short maturities, interest rates are frequently ignored. Odds
quoted in betting markets usually include a bid-ask spread, which in the
context of betting is called the “cut”. Because of the cut, the sum of state
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prices across all event outcomes (even without discounting, i.e., immediately
before the event) is higher than 1, and savvy punters adjust for the cut when
converting betting odds into implied outcome probabilities.
For events whose payoffs are orthogonal to the pricing kernel, betting
odds should not carry a risk premium. Put differently, for such events real-
world probabilities and risk-neutral probabilities should be equal in theory.
This holds for most events on which bets are placed, e.g., for sports events.
For this reason, (cut-adjusted) odds of 4/1 in fractional notation or 5.0 in
decimal notation would be usually interpreted by market participants as
implying a real-world outcome probability of 0.2.4 For political events with
effects on economic variables, non-zero risk premia in betting odds should be
expected from basic financial economics theory. This implies that risk-neutral
outcome probabilities for such events should differ from the corresponding
real-world outcome probabilities. In equations (1) and (2), we use different
symbols for the risk-neutral Leave probabilities depending on the numeraire.
In what follows, we will show that for events affecting exchange rates, not
only do risk-neutral probabilities for different event outcomes differ from
real-world probabilities, but risk-neutral probabilities themselves differ across
currencies, i.e., they depend on the particular probability measure used. This
implies that betting odds in different currencies should differ even if interest
rates in these currencies were identical. This is in contrast to events that are
unrelated to exchange rates: For instance, the risk-neutral probabilities for
the possible outcomes of a soccer game between Italy and Brazil should be
identical under measures Q$ and Q£.
2.2 Exchange Rates under Different Measures
In this section, we present two variants of our model for the reactions of
exchange rate to major events. We start out with deterministic conditional
4This corresponds to common explanations of betting odds, see, e.g., https://
tinyurl.com/y9a4rfxm.
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returns depending on the event outcome, which will then be generalized to
stochastic conditional returns in a mixture of densities model in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Deterministic Conditional Returns
We denote by St the GBPUSD exchange rate, which uses the USD as the
numeraire, and by d (u) the down (up) factor defined by Sτ/St in case of
Leave (Remain). The expected GBPUSD exchange rate under Q$ must be
equal to the forward exchange rate. Assuming that the event outcome does
not depend on the exchange rate (i.e., that the development of the GBPUSD
rate before the referendum does not affect the voting behavior), we get
e(r−i)(τ−t)St = E$t [Sτ ]
= StE$t [d1L + u1R]
= St
[
dq$L + u(1− q$L)
]
. (3)
This martingale condition is equivalent to
dq$L + u(1− q$L) = e(r−i)(τ−t). (4)
Along the same lines, we get for the USDGBP rate, which uses the pound as
numeraire:5
e(i−r)(τ−t)
1
St
= E£t
[
1
Sτ
]
=
1
St
[
1
d
E£t [1L] +
1
u
(1− E£t [1L])
]
(5)
=
1
St
[
q£L
d
+
1− q£L
u
]
, (6)
5For a discussion of exchange rate processes St and 1/St under the corresponding
measures used here, see Hull (2018, Section 30.3).
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which can be rewritten as
q£L
d
+
1− q£L
u
= e(i−r)(τ−t). (7)
The solution to the system of equations (4) and (7) is
d =
q£L
q$L
e(r−i)(τ−t) =
ψ£L
ψ$L
, u =
1− q£L
1− q$L
e(r−i)(τ−t) =
ψ£R
ψ$R
. (8)
Equation (8) relates the conditional returns d and u to the risk-neutral
Leave and Remain probabilities under both risk-neutral measures. For events
that do not affect the GBPUSD exchange rate (e.g., a soccer game between
Italy and Brazil), d = u = exp[(r − i)(τ − t)], which implies q£L = q$L. As
intuition suggests, the risk-neutral probabilities for such events are identical
across numeraires, i.e., they are the same for both currencies. Note that
state prices and, hence, betting odds, may still differ non-negligibly for such
events whenever r 6= i and (τ − t) is large. For events whose outcomes affect
the exchange rate, however, our model implies that the risk-neutral event
probabilities should differ.
2.2.2 Stochastic Conditional Returns
The derivations in Section 2.2.1 still hold in case of stochastic conditional
returns, which we denote by d˜ and u˜. E.g., equation (3) becomes
e(r−i)(τ−t)St = E$t [Sτ ]
= StE$t [d˜1L + u˜1R]
= St
[
d¯q$L + u¯(1− q$L)
]
, (9)
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where d¯ and u¯ are the expected values of d˜ and u˜, respectively. The martin-
gale condition (4) becomes
d¯q$L + u¯(1− q$L) = e(r−i)(τ−t), (10)
and analogous changes apply to equations (6) and (7). For stochastic ex-
change rate reactions to events, equation (8) then reads as
d¯ =
q£L
q$L
e(r−i)(τ−t) =
ψ£L
ψ$L
, u¯ =
1− q£L
1− q$L
e(r−i)(τ−t) =
ψ£R
ψ$R
. (11)
It now relates the expected conditional returns d¯ and u¯ to the risk-neutral
Leave and Remain probabilities under both risk-neutral measures.
As a specific example for the dynamics of exchange rates around major
events, we use a model that is inspired by Hanke et al. (2019). It is rooted
in the literature on option-implied risk-neutral densities (an overview of dif-
ferent estimation methods is provided by Figlewski, 2010). One approach to
modeling risk-neutral return densities uses mixtures of parametric densities.
Ritchey (1990) shows that by mixing two or three normal densities, a wide
range of empirically observed skewness and kurtosis values can be generated
for the combined densities while still retaining analytical tractability. Hanke
et al. (2019) apply this model to exchange rates after major events, and
give the model an economic meaning by interpreting the component densi-
ties as conditional return densities, with the weights corresponding to the
risk-neutral event outcome probabilities estimated from betting odds. For
the Brexit referendum, this means that exchange rates immediately after
the referendum (at time τ) are assumed to be conditionally lognormal, with
parameters of these conditional densities depending on the event outcome.
We denote by φ′t,τ (·) the density of log returns, ln(Sτ/St), under the risk-
neutral measure Q$. Denoting by ln d˜ (ln u˜) the conditional log returns of S
from t to τ in case of Leave (Remain), we define their conditional densities
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as
ln d˜ ∼ N (µ$L(τ − t), σL√τ − t) , (12)
ln u˜ ∼ N (µ$R(τ − t), σR√τ − t) .
The combined risk-neutral density is given as a mixture of these conditional
normal densities (cf. also Figure 1):
φ′t,τ (·) = q$Lφ′t,τ (·|L) + q$Rφ′t,τ (·|R)
= q$LN
(
µ$L(τ − t), σL
√
τ − t)+ q$RN (µ$R(τ − t), σR√τ − t) . (13)
Hanke et al. (2019) estimate the parameters of these conditional distributions
by combining information from betting odds and one-month/three-months
option prices that expire on the day after the respective events. Figure 1
uses the parameters they estimated just less than one month before the ref-
erendum. For this mixture of normals model, d¯ in equations (9)-(11) is given
by d¯ = exp[(µ$L + 0.5σ
2
L)(τ − t)] (u¯ is defined analogously).
Hanke et al. (2019) derive conditional exchange rate forecasts by com-
bining risk-neutral outcome probabilities from betting odds with implied
risk-neutral densities from FX option prices. We note that if observable
betting odds were unbiased and already incorporated the effect described in
equation (11), the outcome-dependent conditionally expected returns in the
exchange rates could be directly inferred from the ratios of the implied risk-
neutral outcome probabilities under different numeraires, without any need
for FX option price data. As long as bookmakers quote identical odds across
transaction currencies, however, this is not possible.
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Figure 1: Conditional return densities for the possible outcomes Leave and
Remain. Parameter values are taken from Hanke et al. (2019, Table 2) and
have been estimated from one-month GBPUSD options and betting odds,
both observed just less than one month before the referendum.
3 Consequences of Equal Betting Odds across
Currencies
Equation (11) shows that risk-neutral probabilities should differ across
currencies for events whose outcomes affect exchange rates. For both events
described in the introduction, however, betting odds quoted by all major
bookmakers and betting exchanges were identical for all transaction cur-
rencies offered on the respective websites. In this section, we analyze the
consequences of such mispricing under two different assumptions: In Sec-
tion 3.1, we start from the assumption of deterministic outcome-dependent
conditional returns introduced in Section 2.2.1. This simplified setting al-
lows us to gain valuable insights by deriving no-arbitrage conditions. Based
on these results, we then show in Section 3.2 that the corresponding arbi-
trage strategies turn into good deals or approximate arbitrage opportunities
under the assumption of stochastic conditional returns, which was analyzed
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in Section 2.2.2.
3.1 Deterministic Conditional Returns: Arbitrage Op-
portunities
Equation (8) shows how the ratios of risk-neutral event outcome proba-
bilities under different numeraires are linked to u and d. Although betting
odds in affected currencies should reflect these relations, they were identical
across transaction currencies for both the Brexit referendum and the U.S.
presidential elections. In this section, we derive no-arbitrage conditions that
apply in this situation.
Denote the state prices available in betting markets for the Brexit example
by p$L (p
£
L). These empirical analogues to the state prices ψL can be computed
from betting odds using the conventions described in Section 2.1. Assume
that we are at time τ−, i.e., immediately before the event, so that pL = qL
in both currencies (cf. equations (1) and (2))6 and exp[(r − i)(τ − t)] =
1. Without loss of generality, assume that d < 1 < u, and contrary to
equation (8), but in line with odds quoted on major websites, p$L = p
£
L . For
the moment, we assume there are no transaction costs for buying/selling
foreign currency. To begin with the simplest case, assume further that there
is no cut, so pR = 1 − pL in both currencies. Equation (8) implies that in
this situation the Leave odds are overpriced in pounds relative to the dollar,
while the opposite holds for the Remain odds. Therefore, a simple arbitrage
strategy can be constructed,7 which starts with zero wealth. This strategy
will be referred to as Strategy 1 in what follows. We borrow 1 pound, bet
p£R pounds on Remain, convert the rest into dollars, and bet the resulting
amount of (1 − p£R)Sτ− dollars on Leave. Stakes and outcome-dependent
payoffs are shown in Figure 2. For a stake of 1 pound, we get an immediate
6Identical results would obtain for t < τ and r = i = 0.
7This strategy is similar to the one suggested by Neuberger (2016), which uses euros
instead of dollars.
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τ− τ τ− τ
0 1/d £
p£R £ on R
(
1− p£R
)
Sτ− $ on L
1 £ 0
L
R
L
R
Figure 2: Strategy 1 – stakes and payoffs for the two bets involved (left: bet
in pounds, right: bet in dollars). Stakes and payoffs are given assuming no
cut, i.e., c = 0), and before repayment of the 1 £ borrowed initially.
payoff of 1 pound in case of Remain, and – converting back after the move of
the exchange rate to Sτ = dSτ− – a payoff of (1/d) pounds in case of Leave.
This is an arbitrage because of d < 1.
If we assume that bookmakers take an identical cut in both currencies
equal to c = pL + pR − 1, following Strategy 1 and betting p£R pounds on
Remain leaves only (p£L − c)Sτ− dollars to bet on Leave. The reduced stake
compared to the case without a cut leads to a proportional reduction in the
payoff to be received if Leave occurs. This reduction may be outweighed by a
sufficiently large move in the exchange rate. Strategy 1 remains an arbitrage
if (after conversion into pounds, and remembering that by assumption p£L =
p$L) [
1− c
p$L
]
1
d
> 1
1− c
p$L
> d. (14)
14
Using equation (8), this leads to
q$L − q£L > c
q$L
p$L
. (15)
If betting odds in dollars available in the market differ from their theoretical
values only because of the cut, three cases are possible: (i) p$L is correct and
p$R is overpriced by c, (ii) p
$
R is correct and p
$
L is overpriced by c, (iii) both
p$L and p
$
R are overpriced so that p
$
L + p
$
R − 1 = c. For case (i), we get from
equation (15)
q$L − q£L > c. (16)
In the other cases, the ratio on the right-hand side of equation (15) will be
smaller than 1. For typical sizes of the cut c observed in practice, however, the
difference will be relatively small, so that equation (16) is a good approxima-
tion that errs on the conservative side: If equation (16) indicates an arbitrage
opportunity, then inequality (15) is satisfied as well. Equation (14) provides
a no-arbitrage condition based on quantities that are either observable in the
market (c, pL) or assumed to be known in our model (d). Equations (15) and
(16) provide simpler relations based on the theoretically correct risk-neutral
probabilities, which cannot be inferred precisely from betting odds available
in the market if c > 0, however.
Alternatively, a similar strategy (“Strategy 2”) can be followed that starts
by borrowing 1 dollar instead of 1 pound. Betting p$L dollars on Leave, con-
verting the rest into pounds and betting it on Remain leads to the following
conditions, which are symmetric to equations (14) to (15):
1− c
p£R
>
1
u
(17)
q£R − q$R > c
q£R
p£R
. (18)
If, in analogy to (but different from) case (ii) described near equation (15),
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the Remain odds in pounds are correct, we get
q£R − q$R > c. (19)
When comparing the no-arbitrage conditions in (14)-(16), which result from
Strategy 1, to the conditions in (17)-(19), which result from Strategy 2,
we note the following: First, whereas conditions (14)-(15) are symmetric to
conditions (17)-(18), they are not equivalent. Hence, there are cases where
an arbitrage strategy can be set up starting from one currency, but not from
the other. This will be illustrated numerically in Section 4. Second, while
equations (16) and (19) are equivalent, they have been derived under different
assumptions: Equation (16) holds if the Leave odds in dollars are correct,
while equation (19) holds if the Remain odds in pounds are correct.
Table 1 summarizes the payoffs associated with our two arbitrage strate-
gies for the base case, with and without a cut. If condition (14) holds,
Strategy 1 yields a positive profit (payoff higher than stake) in case of Leave,
and zero profit in case of Remain. If condition (17) holds, Strategy 2 yields
a positive profit in case of Remain, and zero profit in case of Leave. In what
follows, we show that if and only if both conditions hold, it is possible to
construct combinations of both strategies, which provide a positive profit in
each of the states. To this end, we invest y pounds in Strategy 1 (the “pound
leg” of our combined strategy) and z dollars in Strategy 2 (the “dollar leg”).
Setting z = (1−y)Sτ− normalizes the total amount at stake to the equivalent
of 1 pound. The profit on the pound leg is either zero (in case of Remain) or
profit£L = y
[
1− c
p$L
]
1
d
− y (20)
(in case of Leave, cf. equation (14)). Similarly, the profit on the dollar leg is
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either zero (in case of Leave) or
profit$R = z
[
1− c
p£R
]
u− z (21)
(in case of Remain, cf. equation (17)). Converting this into pounds requires
dividing by the exchange rate, which is Sτ = uSτ− in this case. Hence, the
profit on the combined strategy, expressed in pounds, is
profit£ =
y
([
1− c
p$L
]
1
d
− 1
)
Leave
z
([
1− c
p£R
]
u− 1
)
/ (uSτ−) Remain
. (22)
The payoff in case of Leave (Remain) is positive if and only if condition (14)
(condition (17)) holds. This shows that combinations of the strategies yield-
ing positive profits in both states are possible if and only if both conditions
hold. In this case, it is even possible to construct “risk-free” arbitrage strate-
gies with equal profits in both states. The required amount y∗ to invest in
the pound leg of the combined strategy can be calculated by equating the
profits in both states given in equation (22) and solving for y:
y∗ =
[
1− c
p£R
]
− 1
u[
1− c
p£R
]
− 1
u
+
[
1− c
p$L
]
1
d
− 1
. (23)
The corresponding dollar amount to be invested in the dollar leg is then
z∗ = (1 − y∗)Sτ− . Along the same lines, a strategy providing equal dollar
profits in both states can be constructed, since both arbitrage conditions
need to be satisfied. As noted above, the resulting strategy is symmetric to
that yielding equal pound profits across states, but not equivalent.
In reality, buying and selling of foreign currency involves transaction
costs. Assuming transaction costs γ that are proportional to the transac-
tion amount, Strategy 1 incurs transaction costs (in pounds, cf. Table 1)
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of
γ(1− p£R +
1
d
(p$L − c)/(p$L)), (24)
while Strategy 2 incurs transaction costs (in dollars) of
γ(1− p$L + u(p£R − c)/p£R). (25)
For an arbitrage opportunity to exist, the differences between the two sides
of the inequalities derived above would have to be large enough to cover these
transaction costs.
3.2 Stochastic Conditional Returns: Good Deal/Approximate
Arbitrage Opportunities
As already noted by Neuberger (2016), we could not have completely
ruled out a strengthening of the pound after a majority voting for Leave:
The probability of such a reaction by financial markets may have been small,
but certainly not zero. In this section, we analyze the results of the strategies
discussed above for the assumption of stochastic outcome-dependent condi-
tional returns u˜ and d˜ (cf. Section 2.2.2). The empirical data we will use to
illustrate this case in Section 4.2 are estimated from one-month options. For
this reason, we consider now bets placed at time t < τ− in the presence of
identical odds across currencies. In light of our derivations in Section 2.2, a
good time for placing a bet on a certain outcome would be when the betting
odds for this outcome are very low. Then, today’s exchange rate, which is the
discounted risk-neutral expected value of the exchange rate after the event,
gives rise to large conditionally expected returns. From equation (11), we
see that differences in the risk-free interest rates may slightly dampen or am-
plify the observed mispricing, which results from equal betting odds across
currencies. For most currencies, however, this difference is only of second
order to the effect we describe, particularly in the light of the relatively short
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maturities of most bets. In order to focus on our main message, we therefore
assume r = i = 0 and a cut of 0 in what follows.
In the presence of stochastic conditional returns the strategies described
in the previous section are no longer arbitrage opportunities, but may still
be good deals in the sense of Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2002), i.e., they
may deliver high Sharpe ratios. The results in Section 4.2 will show that for
the two empirical cases analyzed there, they are even approximate arbitrage
opportunities in the sense of Shanken (1992). We reconsider Strategy 1 de-
scribed in Section 3.1, which starts by borrowing 1 pound and is illustrated
in Figure 2. In contrast to Section 3.1, however, we implement the strategy
now at time t < τ . In the absence of a cut and for deterministic conditional
returns, this strategy gives rise to arbitrage opportunities whenever d < 1.
Hence, for a stochastic downward move of size d˜, the strategy is only prof-
itable if the realized return is smaller than 1. The probability for observing a
realization smaller than 1 depends on the parameters of its distribution: The
higher |µPL/σL| (where µPL is the corresponding parameter of the density of d˜
under the real-world probability measure P; note that µL < 0 is necessary
for d¯ < 1), the higher this probability will be.
The (log) return on Strategy 1 is given by
r˜1 =
0 with probability qPR− ln d˜ with probability qPL , (26)
where qPL and q
P
R denote the real-world event probabilities. To assess the
strategy’s attractiveness, any standard approach may be used, such as ex-
pected utility or risk-adjusted performance measures like the Sharpe ratio:
SR1 =
EPt [r˜1]
σr˜1
√
τ − t = −
qPLEPt [ln d˜]
qPLσL(τ − t)
= −µ
P
L
σL
, (27)
where SR1 is the annualized Sharpe ratio of Strategy 1, and EPt [·] denotes
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time t expectation under the real-world measure. Equation (27) shows that
in addition to the probability for a positive payoff of Strategy 1 being, ceteris
paribus, increasing in |µPL/σL|, this expression is also the strategy’s Sharpe
ratio. Estimates for the volatility σL and the risk-neutral expected returns
µ$L and µ
£
L can be obtained using the methodology described in Hanke et al.
(2019). Adding an estimated risk premium to the risk-neutral expected re-
turn yields an estimate for µPL. In the literature (see Figure 3 in Jurek and
Xu, 2014), we find an implied risk premium for the GBPUSD rate of around
2%. Given that implied at-the-money volatilities of 1-month options in the
run-up to the Brexit referendum were around 2-3 times higher than in normal
times (see Figure 3 in Hanke et al., 2019), we use a conservatively high risk
premium of 6% per year for the GBPUSD pair in our calculations. For the
USDMXN rate, Jurek and Xu (2014) do not report a risk premium. The risk
premium range they provide in their Figure 3 for 24 currency pairs is between
–6% and 6% during normal times, with most values between –4% and 4%.
From Hanke et al. (Figure 3 in 2019), we see that 1-month implied volatilities
for USDMXN options in the run-up to the U.S. presidential elections were
around twice as high as usual, leading us to a conservatively high risk pre-
mium estimate of around 12% per year. Our numerical results in Section 4
will show that even with these conservative risk premium estimates, Strategy
1 yields very favorable Sharpe ratios. For Strategy 2, similar considerations
apply.
4 Numerical Illustration
In this section, we illustrate our findings from Section 3 numerically. Fol-
lowing the structure of that section, we start by assuming deterministic con-
ditional returns after events and illustrate the resulting no-arbitrage condi-
tions. Then, we consider the effect of typical cuts observed in the market,
using real-world betting odds that were available for the Brexit referendum
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and the U.S. presidential elections. Finally, we illustrate the stochastic case
using estimated conditional exchange rate distributions.
4.1 Deterministic Conditional Returns
For both events mentioned in the introduction, Hanke et al. (2019, Sec-
tion IV.A) report realized exchange rate moves (GBPUSD and USDMXN)
of around 10%, with precise returns depending on the exact date before the
event that is used for comparison. In their Section V, they show that these
changes could have been forecast quite accurately from observable betting
odds and FX options prices. For someone who ignores the uncertainty in
the conditional return and interprets this number as deterministic, a down-
ward movement in the GBPUSD rate of 10% in case of Leave corresponds to
d = 0.9 in our notation. Risk-neutral Leave probabilities implied from bet-
ting odds were between 0.2-0.4, and risk-neutral Trump probabilities were
between 0.1-0.35. To get a first indication whether arbitrage opportunities
might have existed in practice under this assumption, we plug these values
into equation (11) to see by how much risk-neutral probabilities immediately
before the events should have differed between the two currencies in theory.
From equation (11), we get that the differences between risk-neutral Leave
(Trump) probabilities under the respective numeraires should have been ap-
proximately 2-4 (1-3.5) percentage points. Equations (16) and (19) show that
cuts below these ranges would not have been enough to make these arbitrage
opportunities vanish.
For a more precise calculation, we choose plausible odds that lead to risk-
neutral outcome probabilities in the ranges indicated above. We deliberately
choose values that illustrate numerically the case mentioned in Section 3.1,
where Strategy 1 is an arbitrage, but Strategy 2 is not. Assume that observed
Leave odds are 5.36 in decimal notation, and observed Remain odds are
1.2. Out of ignorance regarding the effect described in this paper, the odds
available in the market are identical across transaction currencies. Assume
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that d = 0.9 and u = 1.03. Converting the odds to state prices yields
p$L = p
£
L = 0.1866, p
$
R = p
£
R = 0.8333, and a cut of almost exactly 2%:
c = pL + pR − 1 = 0.0199. In this situation, the arbitrage condition (17) is
satisfied, as
1− 0.0199
0.8333
> 1/1.03
0.976 > 0.971,
but the arbitrage condition (14) is violated:
1− 0.0199
0.1866
≯ 0.9
0.893 ≯ 0.9.
In the example, we assumed a cut of approximately 2%. In practice,
punters may either place their bets with bookmakers directly, or they may
channel their bets through a betting exchange. When dealing with book-
makers directly, punters can only accept odds quoted by the bookmaker – in
betting jargon, they can only “back” a bet offered by the bookmaker. The
bookmaker quotes odds that imply a cut of around 2-8% to cover his costs
and make a profit. On betting exchanges, punters can both back bets that
are offered by others, and they can offer bets themselves, which is referred
to as “laying” a bet. The latter is analogous to going short in financial mar-
kets. The business model of betting exchanges generates profits not from
the cut, which is typically much smaller than bookmakers’ cuts, but from
commissions, which usually have to be paid by the winning side of a bet.
These commissions are on the order of 5% and may be lower for punters
who generate a lot of transactions on the platform. On Betfair Exchange,
the largest platform, the minimum commission (reserved for prime customers
who generate a lot of business on the platform) is 2% at the time of writing,
which must be added to the bid-ask spread of usually around 0-0.5% to cal-
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culate total transaction costs. When implementing the strategies described
in Section 3.1 on betting exchanges, the commissions they charge provide a
lower bound on transaction costs. This is not the case when placing the re-
spective bets with online bookmakers: Since odds differ across bookmakers,
these differences in odds can be exploited to reduce the cut that effectively
applies by simply dealing with different bookmakers for the two legs of the
strategy.
Comparisons of odds are simplified by dedicated websites, which offer
real-time odds across major bookmakers free of charge. At the time of
writing, www.oddschecker.com is one of the leading odds comparison sites.
To get historical data from this website, the “Wayback Machine” at web.
archive.org can be used, which provides snapshots of websites taken at
irregularly spaced time points in the past (on average every 2-4 days for
www.oddschecker.com in 2016). Table 2 provides bookmakers’ odds from
several large bookmakers for the Brexit referendum, which were retrieved
in this way for June 16, 2016, one week before the referendum. The table
Paddy Power Stan James 888 Sport Ladbrokes William Hill min
Remain 8/15 8/13 6/11 8/15 1/2
Leave 6/4 6/5 16/11 6/4 13/8
Remain 0.652 0.619 0.647 0.652 0.667 0.619
Leave 0.4 0.455 0.407 0.4 0.381 0.381
Cut (in %) 5.22 7.36 5.45 5.22 4.76 0.00
Table 2: Top: Betting odds for the Brexit referendum from selected ma-
jor bookmakers. Bottom: State prices and cuts calculated from these
betting odds. Rightmost column: Best quotes (viewed separately) across
bookmakers for Remain and Leave and resulting effective cut. Source:
www.oddschecker.com, archived at www.webarchive.org on June 16, 2016,
14:52.
shows in the upper part odds across various bookmakers. In the lower part,
we converted the betting odds to state prices (ignoring the negligible interest
rate difference between these two currencies for one week) and calculated the
cut implied in these odds. The rightmost column shows the minimum state
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prices across bookmakers, together with the effective minimum cut a punter
could have achieved by using different bookmakers for the two legs of the
strategy. If this minimum cut had been negative, simple arbitrage strategies
would have been possible with both legs in the same currency. Bookmakers
are well aware of these simple arbitrage strategies and usually take other
bookmakers’ odds into account when deciding which odds to offer. In spite
of this, the existence of arbitrage opportunities has been documented in the
literature, see e.g. Franck et al. (2013) for inter-market arbitrage using bets
placed with bookmakers and betting exchanges. Ensuring that this implied
cut is never negative protects bookmakers from being exploited via simple
arbitrage strategies.
In the presence of the effect described in this paper, however, ensuring a
minimum cut of zero across bookmakers no longer provides protection against
arbitrage. In Table 2, the best available Remain odds of 0.619 were offered
by Stan James, while the best available Leave odds of 0.381 were offered by
William Hill, implying a cut of exactly 0. The simple arbitrage we devised in
Section 3.1 in the absence of a cut (Strategy 1) called for betting on Remain
in pounds and betting on Leave in dollars. To ensure that this strategy is
feasible, we check the respective bookmakers’ websites for the transaction
currencies they offer, confirming that Stan James does offer pounds and
William Hill does offer dollars as transaction currencies. Putting a stake of
0.619 pounds on Remain with Stan James, converting the rest into dollars,
and betting 0.381SGBPUSDτ− dollars on Leave with William Hill would have
resulted in a payout of 1 pound in case of Remain and 1/d > 1 pounds after
converting back from dollars. In the absence of transaction costs, the only
condition required for a profit in case of Leave is d < 1, i.e., a weakening of
the pound in case of Leave, and the correct anticipation of this effect. For
the alternative outcome of Remain, the strategy protects against any losses.
For the U.S. presidential elections, a similar example can be provided.
Following the derivation in Section 2, which used the terminology of the
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Brexit case, we note that the analogue to the GBPUSD rate in terms of
notation is the (lesser used) MXNUSD rate, so the peso takes on the role
of the pound in the derivation. When using this rate, the weakening of the
Mexican peso expected in case of Trump winning the elections corresponds
to a downward movement. Trump, in turn, is the outcome analogue of Leave
in the derivation. When comparing bookmakers, we have to make sure that
the bookmaker we select for betting on Clinton accepts the Mexican peso as
transaction currency. While all major bookmakers accept British pounds and
most of them accept U.S. dollars, currencies like the peso are only accepted
on a handful of websites. The upper part of Table 3 shows odds quoted by
two major bookmakers on Nov. 6 and on Nov. 7, 2016 – one (two) day(s)
before the elections. The lower half shows state prices and implied cuts
calculated from these odds. The best available Trump odds on these days
investable in Mexican pesos were offered by bet365, while the best available
Clinton odds investable in U.S. dollars were offered by Betfair Sportsbook
(the bookmaker, not the betting exchange). From Table 3, we see that by
Nov. 6 Nov. 7
bet365 Betfair Sportsbook bet365 Betfair Sportsbook
Clinton 2/7 2/7 2/9 1/5
Trump 3 10/3 7/2 9/2
Clinton 0.778 0.778 0.818 0.833
Trump 0.25 0.231 0.222 0.182
Cut (in %) 2.78 0.85 4.04 1.52
Table 3: Top: Betting odds for the U.S. presidential elections 2016 from
selected major bookmakers. Bottom: State prices and cuts calculated
from these betting odds. Source: www.oddschecker.com, archived at
www.webarchive.org on Nov. 6, 2016, 01:19, and on Nov. 7, 2016, 22:12.
betting on Clinton with bet365 and on Trump with Betfair Sportsbook, the
cut is 0.85% on Nov. 6 and 0 on Nov. 7. On Nov. 6, we start with 1 peso and
put a stake of 0.778 pesos on Clinton with bet365. We convert the rest of
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0.222 pesos to dollars and bet 0.222SMXNUSDτ− dollars on Trump with Betfair
Sportsbook. This leads to a payoff of either 1 peso in case of Clinton winning,
or to a payoff of 0.222/0.231/d pesos after converting back from dollars for a
Trump victory. In the absence of transaction costs, the strategy would have
remained an arbitrage for any (correctly anticipated) conditional exchange
rate return d < 0.222/0.231 ≈ 0.96, i.e., for a weakening of the Mexican
peso by more than about 4% as a result of Trump winning. On Nov. 7, we
get from the same strategy either 1 peso or 0.182/0.182/d pesos, requiring
again only the correct anticipation of a weakening of the peso, regardless of
its magnitude.
Transaction costs arising from the need to exchange currencies when im-
plementing the strategies vary across market participants. For institutionals
with access to interdealer FX platforms, Karnaukh, Ranaldo, and So¨derlind
(2015, Table 2) report effective average costs of 0.7 bp for the GBPUSD
pair. Increased competition from new service providers and among credit
card companies has led to decreasing transactions costs for retail clients as
well, even when considering all potential cost components. In total, they can
be kept very small: First, internet betting providers regularly allow punters
to pay by credit card without any fees. We explicitly checked that for bet365,
where we would have placed our bet on Clinton in pesos. Second, many card
issuers nowadays do not charge any foreign transaction fees, so that transac-
tion costs can be easily limited to the markup of card network providers, i.e.,
the difference between their conversion rates and interbank mid-price. For
major currency pairs such as the EURUSD rate, major networks like Visa or
Mastercard have markups of 0.2-0.3% above mid-market, and even for less
liquid currencies like the Norwegian kroner, a US-based investor would face
markups of only 0.3-0.6%.8 Given that the Mexican peso is more liquid than
the Norwegian kroner (BIS, 2016, p. 5), we take these values as an upper
bound for the proportional transaction costs γ (see Section 3.1) a punter
8See, e.g., https://nomadgate.com/visa-vs-mastercard-exchange-rate/.
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would have faced for the peso bet. Still assuming d = 0.9, plugging γ = 0.3%
into equation (24) on June 16, when the risk-neutral Remain probability was
61.9%, yields a conservative estimate for transaction costs related to Strat-
egy 1 in the Brexit case of 0.003(1− 0.619 + 1/0.9) = 0.0045 or 0.45%. For
the U.S. presidential elections, using γ = 0.6%, a risk-neutral Clinton prob-
ability of 77.8%, and a cut of c = 0.85% on Nov. 6 gives transaction costs
of about 0.006(1 − 0.222 + (0.778 − 0.0085)/0.9/0.778) = 0.0112 or 1.12%.
Hence, in addition to getting the direction of the exchange movements right,
the movements would have had to be large enough to cover these transaction
costs for our strategies to be profitable.
4.2 Stochastic Conditional Returns
In Section 4.1, we placed bets a few days before the events, and we as-
sumed the conditional exchange rate reactions after the respective events to
be deterministic and known ex ante. In this section, we will implement the
strategies at an earlier point in time, i.e., one month before the events, and
we will assume exchange rates to be lognormally distributed conditional on
the possible event outcomes. Hanke et al. (2019) show that the mixture of
lognormals model prices observed FX option prices prior to the events with
high precision when using risk-neutral event outcome probabilities implied
from observed betting odds. As a by-product of their analysis, they estimate
parameters of the conditional return distributions. As an illustrative exam-
ple, we use the parameter values they provide in their Table 2 for the first day
when one-month FX options were traded that expired after the respective
events.
In Section 4.1, we found that the best betting odds observed in both
markets shortly before the respective events implied a cut of 0. We find
many such occasions in the weeks before the U.S. presidential elections as
well: a cut of zero is observable on 7 out of 14 days for which we have data
in the month before the elections. In contrast, this holds only for 2 out of
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GBPUSD USDMXN
µL(τ − t) –8.66 µT(τ − t) 7.49
µR(τ − t) 1.87 µN(τ − t) –1.38
σL
√
τ − t 4.49 σT
√
τ − t 6.35
σR
√
τ − t 2.85 σN
√
τ − t 5.35
Table 4: Parameters (in percent) of the conditional densities described in
equations (12) and (13) as reported in Hanke et al. (2019, Table 2). Densities
are estimated for the first day when one-month options were traded that
expired after the respective events.
16 observations in the month before the Brexit referendum. On the days
for which the cut is greater than zero, it is 1-1.5% for the U.S. presidential
elections and 1.7-3.9% for the Brexit referendum. When implementing the
strategies discussed above on a day with a non-zero cut, the cut reduces the
strategies’ returns, which, in turn, reduces the resulting Sharpe ratios.
For the U.S. presidential elections, we observe betting odds that imply
a cut of zero at time t=Oct. 8, 2016 (one month before the elections). The
interesting density to be exploited with our strategies is the conditional den-
sity in case of Trump winning the elections, which is indicated in Table 4
by the subscript T. For the exchange rate risk premium, we assume conser-
vatively a value of 1% per month, which is way higher than usual estimates
(see Section 3.2). Transaction costs to be included in the calculation of the
Sharpe ratio can be computed using equation (24), similar to our calcula-
tions in Section 4.1.9 For a risk-neutral Clinton probability of 74.8% on
Oct. 8, we estimate transaction costs of 0.006(1 − 0.748 + 1/0.9) = 0.82%.
The resulting Sharpe ratio after accounting for conservative estimates for
the risk premium and transactions costs would still be a very favorable
SR1 ≈ (7.49 − 1 − 0.82)
√
12/6.35 = 0.89
√
12 = 3.09 when ignoring the
9For a more exact estimation, d¯ implied by the parameters in Table 4 plus the estimated
risk premium could be used instead of d in equation (24). This would yield slightly lower
values for the transaction costs than for d = 0.9, so our values are again conservative
estimates.
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(negligibly low) one-month GBP interest rate. The fact that µPR is, conserva-
tively estimated, 0.89 standard deviations away from 0 implies a probability
of N(0.89) = 81.3% for a positive return of this strategy in case of Trump
winning the elections, given our assumptions (in case of Clinton winning, the
strategy always leads to a return of exactly 0).
For the GBPUSD density, the observed cut on May 25, 2016 (just less
than one month before the referendum) was 2.8%. For the risk-neutral ex-
change rate density in case of a majority voting for Leave, Table 4 provides a
conditionally expected log return of µ$L(τ−t) = −8.66% and a standard devi-
ation of 4.49%. Transaction costs are estimated by using γ = 0.3% (see Sec-
tion 4.1) in equation (24) and noting that the risk-neutral Remain probability
on May 25 was 81.2%: 0.003(1−0.188+(0.812−0.028)/0.9/0.812)) = 0.0057
or 0.57%. Accounting for these transaction costs, for a conservative as-
sumption of an exchange rate risk premium of 0.5% per month (see Sec-
tion 3.2), and the cut of 2.8% when calculating the Sharpe ratio, we get
SR1 ≈ (8.66 − 2.8 − 0.5 − 0.57)
√
12/4.49 = 1.07
√
12 = 3.70 when ignoring
the (very small) one-month USD interest rate. The fact that µPL is, conserva-
tively estimated, 1.07 standard deviations away from 0 implies a probability
of N(1.07) = 85.8% for a positive return of this strategy in case of an out-
come of Leave, given our assumptions (in case of Remain, the strategy always
leads to a return of exactly 0).
These numerical examples show that ignoring the numeraire-dependence
of risk-neutral probabilities described in Section 2, i.e., offering the same odds
for such events across currencies, may present a sizable risk to bookmakers
and betting exchanges. Given the size of betting markets for these events
mentioned in the introduction (£ 127m and £ 200m, respectively), this risk
is not to be neglected: While the strategies described only result in arbitrage
profits in a strict sense when assuming deterministic exchange rate reactions,
relaxing this assumption results in highly favorable risk-return ratios, making
the strategies “very good deals” or even approximate arbitrage opportunities
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in the sense of Shanken (1992), i.e., strategies with more than twice the
market Sharpe ratio. For both events discussed here, there were several
occasions when an effective cut of zero was “investable” in betting markets.
In the absence of transaction costs (currency conversion), this means that
to rule out losses, an investor just had to get the direction of the exchange
rate reaction right, i.e., correctly forecast that a majority voting in favor of
Leave (Trump) would result in a weakening of the pound (peso) relative to
the dollar. Taking transaction costs into account, the required move of the
exchange rate in the desired direction was still very small, i.e., around 0.5-
1%. For bets placed on days when the cut was positive, the exchange rate
move would have been large enough to cover the cut on top of transaction
costs. Implementing these strategies in practice is not completely risk-free,
since nobody could have ruled out, e.g., a strengthening in the pound after
a majority voting for Leave. However, the conditionally expected exchange
rates implied in FX option prices before the respective events allowed both
high forecast accuracy and high confidence in the direction of the conditional
changes (see Hanke et al., 2019).
5 Conclusion
We have shown that for events whose outcomes affect exchange rates,
risk-neutral event outcome probabilities are numeraire dependent. Simple
no-arbitrage conditions have been derived and illustrated numerically under
the assumption of deterministic exchange rate reactions after the respective
events. For stochastic conditional exchange rate movements, the strategies
described are no longer arbitrage opportunities, but may still be good deals,
e.g., in terms of their Sharpe ratios. The conditions provided in this paper can
and should be used by internationally active bookmakers to adjust their odds
for such events according to the transaction currency. Even bookmakers who
are only active domestically should adjust their odds accordingly to protect
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themselves from being exploited by the strategies described. Ignoring this
effect, as seems to be current market practice, may lead to losses well in
excess of a bookmaker’s cut. This may present a high risk given the size of
betting markets for such events. Our numerical examples have shown that
both around the Brexit referendum and the U.S. presidential elections, odds
available in betting markets would have allowed for very profitable strategies
combining bets in different currencies. The effect described is not limited to
betting markets, but occurs more generally for events risks that are correlated
with exchange rates, and traded as financial contracts in different currencies.
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